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by: Kerri A. Thompson
ABSTRACT
Employing facial recognition technology implicates anti-discrimination law
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when used as a factor in employment
decisions. The very technological breakthroughs that made facial recognition
technology commercially viable—data compression and artificial intelli-
gence—also contribute to making facial recognition technology discrimina-
tory in its effect on members of classes protected by Title VII. This Article first
explains how facial recognition technology works and its application in em-
ployee background checks. Then, it analyzes whether the use of facial recogni-
tion technology in background checks violates Title VII under the disparate
impact theory of liability due to the known issue of skewed data sets and dis-
proportionate inaccuracy on some populations. The Article concludes by call-
ing on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to issue specific
guidance warning employers of impending liability under Title VII, including
class action liability, due to the use of facial recognition technology, and to use
its enforcement authority to file lawsuits against employers who continue to
use the technology.
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I. FACIAL RECOGNITION AND EMPLOYER BACKGROUND CHECKS
A. How Employers Use Facial Recognition in Background Checks
When employers conduct background checks on job candidates,
they generally use third-party consumer reporting agencies to search
for an applicant’s name through databases of public records, including
arrest records, felony convictions, and liens, with the goal of verifying
an applicant’s identity and determining whether an applicant has a
criminal record.1 Some third-party agencies offer facial recognition
technology as an additional step in the background check process,
claiming that the technology makes the process more accurate. This
Article argues that employers should not take advantage of this addi-
tional service. Currently, facial recognition technology actually makes
background check results less accurate, and using it may expose the
employer to liability for employment discrimination.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers may not
make employment decisions, limit employment opportunities, or
make decisions that would tend to deprive individuals of employment
opportunities, because of sex or race, among other protected classes.2
Using facial recognition technology in an employment background
check is less accurate when used on certain groups, even when it is
applied uniformly to everyone who applies for an open position. A
recent study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”)3 tested several facial recognition algorithms on different
demographics to test whether the algorithm was as accurate when
compared across different racial-, ethnic-, and sex-based groups. The
report found the algorithms to have, in some cases, wildly different
accuracy levels for some groups, with a higher rate of error for Ameri-
1. See, e.g., Brian T. Horowitz, Facial Recognition Aids Background Checks,
PCMAG (June 21, 2019), https://www.pcmag.com/article/368500/selfie-request-facial-
recognition-aids-background-checks [https://perma.cc/3ND2-XVDS]; Laura Denton,
Don’t Panic! Background Screening Explained, HIRE RIGHT BLOG (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.hireright.com/blog/background-checks/dont-panic-background-screening-
explained [https://perma.cc/J9R2-RKX9]; Not All Background Checks Are Created
Equal, EVIDENT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.evidentid.com/resources/not-all-back
ground-checks-are-created-equal-2/ [https://perma.cc/G977-X6EU].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
3. PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STAN-
DARDS & TECH., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC
EFFECTS 1 (Dec. 2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280 [https://perma.cc/9JG7-
RDLC].
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can Indian women and women of Asian and African descent.4 For
example, because the accuracy level is much lower for African African
women, using the technology would tend to deprive these women of
employment opportunities: it would have a disparate impact on them,
even if the employer was not singling them out for different
treatment.
Background check services vary in the databases they search. Be-
cause background checks are used to check for a job candidate’s crim-
inal background, the employer’s background check will search public
records of systems used by law enforcement. Some search the Na-
tional Criminal Screen and county data where the candidate lives, or
county data where the National Criminal Screen has flagged a poten-
tial record, while other services search every county in which the indi-
vidual has resided for the past seven years.5 The results of the
background check sweep are usually a variation on either “pass,” with
no matches found in these government databases, or “fail,” which
means that some kind of flag has been detected.6 Of course, employ-
ers who get thousands of job applications likely will not consider
someone with a flag, and these candidates will be rejected.7
Facial recognition technology, when used as part of a background
check, not only searches for the candidate’s name in court records and
criminal records, but also searches for the candidate’s face.8 In order
for a third-party background check service to perform the check and
query whether the target photo matches any photos in the database,
the photos in the database must have already been analyzed by facial
recognition technology, which is commonly done. According to the
Georgetown Law Perpetual Lineup report from 2016, one in four of
all American state and local law enforcement agencies had the capa-
bility to “run face recognition searches of their own databases, run
those searches on another agency’s face recognition system, or [had]
the option to access such a system.”9 Of the twenty-five jurisdictions
surveyed by the Perpetual Lineup study, none of the surveyed jurisdic-
4. Id. at 47.
5. See Not All Background Checks Are Created Equal, supra note 1, at 5.
6. See Horowitz, supra note 1, at 2.
7. While the Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) provides some protection
to employees who are rejected based on a background check, it does not provide a
fulsome remedy for those who are passed over at this stage in the hiring process. The
FCRA provides that employers who make an adverse employment decision based on
information in a background check must notify the candidate with an adverse action
notice, but an employer is not required to hold a job open if someone needs to correct
incorrect information in his or her background report. See Ryan Neumeyer, 5 Steps
for Making an Employment Decision Based on a Background Check, MCDONALD
HOPKINS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://mcdonaldhopkins.com/Insights/Blog/Employer-Ad-
vocate/2017/11/20/5-steps-for-making-an-employment-decision-based-on-a-back-
ground-check [https://perma.cc/54WH-E6CX].
8. See Horowitz, supra note 1, at 2–3.
9. See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. AT GEO.
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tions limited enrollment in the database based on the underlying of-
fense, meaning that a background check facial recognition algorithm
trained to recognize matches in such a database will flag people with
any kind of arrest record, including those who have been arrested for
a misdemeanor, those who have been arrested and then dismissed
without charges, and those who have been found not guilty.10
B. Ban the Box Laws Protect the Convicted; Facial Recognition
Shuts Out the Innocent
Lawmakers have already recognized one aspect of the problem that
underlies background check screening: employers who rely on crimi-
nal background information as a way to screen unsuitable employees
may be using criminal background as a proxy for race because of the
overrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos in the criminal
justice system. Ban the box laws, for example, are targeted toward
preventing employers from asking a question about criminal back-
ground that disproportionately removes African Americans and Lati-
nos from the applicant pool. These laws prohibit an employer from
asking an applicant about his or her criminal record on an initial job
application, but do not prohibit running criminal background checks
and eventually making employment decisions based on criminal
records, as long as those decisions are nuanced to fit the job
description.11
But laws like ban-the-box, already limited in their scope, do not
reach the discriminatory effect of facial recognition. Facial recognition
technology is an added layer to the background check that has a re-
doubling effect on African Americans and Latinos. If an applicant is
falsely matched with someone with a criminal record, he or she is
barred from consideration, just as the individual who actually has the
criminal record would be. Discriminating against potential employees
based on a blanket policy of barring anyone who has ever been ar-
rested has already been proscribed by the EEOC.12 But discriminating
against potential employees based on a false match will affect even
L. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/findings/deployment [https://
perma.cc/S9TA-83PE].
10. With regard to the use of such a database, several jurisdictions have no legal
standard for how the database may be used, other than it may be used for any law
enforcement or criminal justice purpose. Jurisdictions with such unlimited deploy-
ment include the FBI, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Vermont, Lincoln, Nebraska, Los Angeles, Maricopa County,
Northern Virginia Regional Information System, San Diego Association of Govern-
ments, San Francisco, Seattle Region and the West Virginia Intelligence Fusion
Center. See id.
11. See Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1441–43, 1455–70 (2014).
12. See Pre-Employment Inquiries and Arrests & Conviction, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_arrest_convict
ion.cfm [https://perma.cc/5GYU-8EMW]; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, U.S. EQUAL
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more people: African Americans, Latinos, and others with no criminal
records might be falsely matched with an African American, Latino,
or anyone else in the databases who does have a criminal record. Iron-
ically, ban the box laws would provide protection to someone who has
a criminal record, but would not offer recourse for an applicant whose
face was falsely matched to someone with a criminal record.
C. Biased Outcomes from Objective Algorithms
The Seattle Police Department claims the facial recognition tech-
nology it uses to scan a suspect’s photo “does not see race” and there-
fore cannot exhibit racial bias, meaning that because the technology
does not explicitly include race as an attribute in its code, the al-
gorithm cannot produce outcomes that prefer one race over another.13
This claim of racial blindness is false because facial recognition has
been independently assessed and proven to be less accurate on certain
populations—even if the algorithm does not explicitly include race as
an attribute, the outcomes still favor one race over another.14
The problem is compounded when a target photo is searched for in
a law enforcement database. Because African Americans are arrested
by law enforcement at disproportional rates, they are overrepresented
in mug shot databases (especially considering that such databases do
not scrub data for no-charges or not-guilty verdicts, and will thus pick
up any police encounter that ends in arrest).15 In addition, facial rec-
ognition algorithms disproportionately provide false positives for Af-
rican Americans.16 If the algorithm tends to provide false positives,
and if there are more photos of African Americans in the databases,
the target’s likelihood of being falsely matched to someone with a
“criminal” background will skyrocket. As the Georgetown Perpetual
Lineup study notes, facial recognition “may be overused on the seg-
ment of the population on which it underperforms.”17
Someone applying to jobs online where employers use facial recog-
nition technology in their background checks may thus run into a
problem: the algorithm may match a female African American appli-
cant (the population for which facial recognition is the least likely to
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction
.cfm [https://perma.cc/TB2A-JGZN].
13. Garvie et al., supra note 9.
14. See generally GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 2; see also Ignacio N. Confone,
Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1396
(2019).
15. Garvie et al., supra note 9.
16. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 2. The NIST report from 2019 analyzed
more algorithms and found that African Americans had more false positives than
false negatives. Id. However, the Perpetual Lineup notes that, based on a 2012 FBI
report, African Americans were less likely to be identified in facial recognition
databases (i.e., they had more false negatives than false positives). See Garvie et al.,
supra note 9. The NIST report is more current and analyzed more data.
17. Garvie et al., supra note 9.
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be accurate) to the identity of a totally different person, and that per-
son may have a criminal background. The applicant is then shut out
from the job solely because an algorithm taught itself to produce out-
comes that consistently favor non-African American applicants. The
technology intended to be a more objective gateway thus becomes an
insurmountable, automated barrier.
II. HOW FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY WORKS
A. How to Recognize a Face
The two goals of facial recognition technology—mimicking the ac-
tivities of the human brain to recognize faces18 and providing more
objective results than humans19—are at odds with each other. Visual
facial recognition in humans is very highly developed and plays a criti-
cal role in social interaction, but it is never “objective.”20 The ways of
perceiving a face and the meanings attached to those perceptions are
inconsistent and context-dependent; there is no one “objective” way
to recognize a face.21 A system that strives to recognize faces as
humans cannot claim to be objective or immune to bias.22
Human perception of faces varies within populations and among
individuals.23 Certain individuals can recognize familiar faces well, but
not unfamiliar ones, while other individuals demonstrate the opposite
strengths.24 Humans also often exhibit “own-race bias,” or being less
able to recognize faces from races other than the one they consider
their own.25 The algorithms designed by humans are no different: they
can exhibit race bias, gender bias, and a bias toward recognizing the
race of the programmers who designed them.26
18. See ASIT KUMAR DATTA, MADHURA DATTA & PRADIPTA KUMAR
BANERJEE, FACE DETECTION AND RECOGNITION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (2016).
19. See KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECH-
NOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 10 (2011).
20. See, e.g., ALEXANDER TODOROV, FACE VALUE: THE IRRESISTIBLE INFLUENCE
OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9–48 (2017) (describing how physiognomists interpreted the
meaning of various facial features based on national stereotypes).
21. GATES, supra note 19, at 10–11 (“Just as there is no standard or universal way
of seeing, there is no universal way of seeing the face.”).
22. Not least because, ultimately, algorithms are programmed to make decisions
on behalf of humans. See, e.g., SARFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRES-
SION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 1, 26 (2018) (stating decisions
made by algorithms are ultimately made by human beings).
23. See GATES, supra note 19, at 10–11.
24. See Vicki Bruce, Peter J. B. Hancock & A. Mike Burton, Human Face Percep-
tion and Identification, in FACE RECOGNITION: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATIONS
51–72 (Harry Wechsler et al. eds., 1998).
25. GATES, supra note 19, at 10–11.
26. See, e.g., P. Jonathon Phillips et al., An Other-Race Effect for Face Recognition
Algorithms, 8 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON APPLIED PERCEPTION 10 (2011); GROTHER ET
AL., supra note 3, at 39; see also Kathleen L. Hourihan et al., A Cross-Race Effect in
Metamemory: Predictions of Face Recognition Are More Accurate for Members of Our
Own Race, 1 J. APPLIED RSCH. MEMORY & COGNNITION 158, 164 (2012).
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If the algorithms that recognize faces cannot achieve what they ad-
vertise, why do employers use them? Other biometric identification
methods, such as fingerprints, are more accurate. Fingerprints are
more consistent over time: faces age and can be changed with cosmet-
ics and various obstructions whereas fingerprints generally need more
radical work to be changed.27 However, the United States military
heavily invested in and developed facial recognition technology in the
1990s, not in widespread fingerprinting. Facial recognition technology
was touted as non-invasive, more easily accepted by the public than
fingerprints, and as the only biometric that can be captured without a
person’s consent.28 Researchers thought that because the technology
“simply recognized people the way humans do,” it would be more ac-
ceptable than fingerprinting, which is associated with criminal identifi-
cation, and retinal scanning, which involves scanning the blood vessels
in one’s eyes.29
The idea that faces can be read and interpreted for meaning is an-
cient. Physiognomists claimed to be able to read the forehead for in-
telligence and the nose for morality, and such facial assessments were
even used for employment—servants, for example, would be analyzed
before their hiring to assure good moral character and fitness for the
position.30 Such assessments were based on “blatantly racist beliefs”
and illustrations of “national types,” but were lauded at the time as
objective assessments based on common sense.31
For a modern example of facial recognition technology presenting
biased results, consider that Google, one of the preeminent tech com-
panies and which must, as such, use state-of-the-art engineering in its
algorithms, automatically tagged photos of African Americans as
“apes” and “animals” in 2015.32 Google claimed that such a horrifying
error was aberrant, but the incident shows that automatically pro-
duced results are not synonymous with objective, accurate, or fair re-
sults—and may in fact be the opposite in each case. Closer analysis of
the technical aspects of facial recognition technology belies an under-
lying subjectivity that is as susceptible to bias as is the human who
designs it.
27. Garvie et al., supra note 9; see also PATRICK J. GROTHER, GEORGE W. QUINN
& P. JONATHON PHILLIPS, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF 2D STILL-IMAGE FACE RECOGNITION ALGORITHM 1, 2 (2011).
28. GATES, supra note 19, at 44–45.
29. Id.
30. TODOROV, supra note 20; see also Sahil Chinoy, Opinion, The Racist History
Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://
perma.cc/A7EC-NNEE].
31. See TODOROV, supra note 20, at 17.
32. See NOBLE, supra note 22, at 6.
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B. The Development of Facial Recognition Technology:
From Likeness to Likely
At the 1970 World’s Fair in Osaka, a scientist took photographs of
passers-by for an exhibition entitled “Computer Physiognomy.” Based
on a computer analysis of the photograph, he told them which of
seven celebrities they most resembled.33 Rudimentary iterations of fa-
cial recognition technology have existed since the late 1960s, but the
technology was limited by computer processing power much weaker
than current capabilities. Facial recognition changed in the 1990s when
the U.S. Department of Defense developed the Face Recognition
Technology (“FERET”) program, allowing researchers to share infor-
mation about their algorithms and compare different approaches,
which advanced the state-of-the-art technologies.34
Several different technologies are often collapsed into the label of
facial recognition technology, including facial authentication and tar-
get facial recognition.35 Facial authentication matches a new, un-
known image to several images of the same individual, verifying
whether the unknown individual is the same person or a different
one.36 Facial authentication is what the iPhone uses to recognize a
user with Face ID, and it is generally easier to make more accurate as
the software only needs to match the unknown face to the images of
one individual, not compare it to several different individuals.37
33. GATES, supra note 19, at 25.
34. See P. JONATHON PHILLIPS, HYEONJOON MOON, SYED A. RIZVI & PATRICK J.
RAUSS, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., THE FERET EVALUATION METHOD-
OLOGY FOR FACE-RECOGNITION ALGORITHMS 1, 2–4 (1999).
35. Other applications of facial recognition technology include facial movement
analysis, another technology used by companies to assess applicants’ body language in
job interviews, or emotion detection, which uses face scanning to detect certain emo-
tions. See, e.g., Ivan Manokha, How Using Facial Analysis in Job Interviews Could
Reinforce Inequality, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 7, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/economy/making-sense/how-using-facial-recognition-in-job-interviews-
could-reinforce-inequality [https://perma.cc/BUB8-YQC2] (stating face scanning
company HireVue analyzes language and body language to predict how well the can-
didate will perform on the job); Oscar Schwartz, Don’t Look Now: Why You Should
Be Worried About Machines Reading Your Emotions, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/06/facial-recognition-software-
emotional-science [https://perma.cc/6BB6-CTYT] (describing the “objective” analysis
of faces to deduce emotions).
36. See, e.g., Andrew Gebhart, Facial Recognition: Apple, Amazon, Google and
the Race For Your Face, CNET (Mar. 18, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-
to/facial-recognition-apple-amazon-google-and-the-race-for-your-face-facebook/
[https://perma.cc/2UUT-78QM].
37. Apple’s facial authentication system, Face ID, is generally considered to be
more accurate than target facial recognition, partially because the software is using
images from an infrared camera that can measure depth, and each time the camera is
used on a face, the software has a deeper database from which to authenticate an
image. See, e.g., id.
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Target facial recognition involves more complex programming.38
The software first must have a database of known faces from which to
match.39 Then, the software must be able to analyze an image to see if
there is a face in it, picking a face out of a background of image
“noise” (facial detection).40 Then, it must measure the target face us-
ing the same measurements it used to measure the database of known
faces.41 This last crucial step—how the face is measured to compare it
to others—slowed down the development of target facial recognition
from its initial development in the 1960s because, to analyze a face
most accurately, one would have to take into account thousands of
variables.42 Early facial recognition algorithms were not automated
and required manual input.43 Local feature analysis was one such
method, which represented the face as a graph of data points but re-
quired manual input for grid structures and was not automated.44 This
Article will focus on target facial recognition applications of facial rec-
ognition technology—using a target face and looking for the same
face in a database of previously identified faces (such as running a
photo of a suspect through a database of mug shots).
The first breakthrough in target facial recognition came in the late
1980s through data compression.45 Developers were able to narrow
down how much data was needed to successfully match a target face
to faces in a database using principal component analysis.46 Essen-
tially, the images are reduced in dimensions to their “principal compo-
nents.”47 For example, if a face has one thousand different
characteristics that vary when compared to another face, not all of the
thousand different characteristics are necessary to distinguish one face
from the other.48 The programmer instead chooses principal compo-
nents to compare. Instead of comparing all data, the software “flat-




42. See id. at 5–7.
43. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Comm. on Tech., Comm. on Homeland & Nat’l
Sec., Subcomm. on Biometrics, Face Recognition, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/file-reposi
tory/about-us-cjis-fingerprints_biometrics-biometric-center-of-excellences-face-recog
nition.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XJB-G7Y7].
44. Stefano Arca, Paola Campadelli & Raffaella Lanzarotti, A Face Recognition
System Based on Local Feature Analysis, 2003 AUDIO & VIDEO-BASED PERSON AU-
THENTICATION PROC. 1, 1 (2003) https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44887-x_22 [https://
perma.cc/NN4B-Y6Q5].
45. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council et al., supra note 43 (describing Kirby and
Sirovitch’s application of principal component analysis to face recognition); see gener-
ally L. Sirovich & M. Kirby, A Low-Dimensional Procedure for the Characterization
of Human Faces, 4 J. OPTICAL SOC. AM. A. 519, 519–24 (1987).
46. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council et al., supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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tens” the data so it can be more easily manipulated and compared
with less computer processing power.49
Researchers in facial recognition technology applied principal com-
ponent analysis to facial recognition by compressing the data stored in
a face—compressing perhaps one thousand attributes to just one hun-
dred—and by using statistical variance methods to weigh which faces
looked least like each other.50 By process of elimination, the code
eventually finds the faces that most resemble each other based on the
compressed attributes.51 The facial recognition application of principal
component analysis is termed Eigenfaces.52
Eigenfaces algorithms find the “mean image” in a dataset by first
comparing the two most dissimilar faces in a dataset, then the next
two, and so on.53 After ordering the faces according to their similarity,
the algorithm computes the mean image, or a “ghost image,” so-called
because it is an average of all of the faces in the databases and is not
itself one of the database’s “real” faces.54 When the algorithm sees a
new face, the target face, it measures how closely the target face re-
sembles the faces in the dataset.55 The programmer sets a minimum
threshold for how closely the faces need to be in order to “match.”56 If
the face meets the threshold, it is “recognized,” and if not, the image
is not found among the dataset and no match is produced.57
By compressing the data in a face in order to measure the face,
Eigenfaces essentially changes the inquiry from which faceprint
matches this faceprint to which face in the database meets a minimum
threshold of similarity to this face. In other words, which known face
is most likely to match this unknown face? Depending on what the
risks are in creating false positives (for example, higher risk in a crimi-
nal database or lower risk in a Facebook photo image recognizing sys-
tem), the threshold for how similar the photos need to be to produce a
49. See StatQuest with Josh Starmer, Principal Component Analysis Clearly Ex-
plained, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UVHneBU
BW0 [https://perma.cc/R2JD-7XV4].
50. Matthew A. Turk & Alex P. Pentland, Face Recognition Using Eigenfaces,
1991 INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS PROC. 586, 587 (1981), https://sites.cs.ucsb.edu/
~mturk/Papers/mturk-CVPR91.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSG4-YU69].
51. Id.
52. Id. (explaining “Eigenfaces” took its name from “Eigenvectors”). The prefix
“eigen-” in German denotes ownership or property and is occasionally translated as
“proper vector.” ELIZABETH S. MECKES & MARK W. MECKES, LINEAR ALGEBRA 1,
69 (2018).
53. Nev Acar, Eigenfaces: Recovering Humans from Ghosts, TOWARDS DATA SCI.
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/eigenfaces-recovering-humans-from-





57. See, e.g., Shang-Hung Lin, An Introduction to Face Recognition Technology, 3
INFORMING SCI. 1, 5 (2000).
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match can be raised or lowered.58 Because software code is protected
under trade secrets law,59 software code is generally unavailable to the
public, and it is therefore impossible to divine exactly how similar the
target face has to be to the faces in the database: the programmer
decides based on a balance struck between accuracy and expediency,
making a subjective choice as to how likely is like enough.
Despite such advances within the last five years60 and the sudden
omnipresent presence of facial recognition technology,61 these tech-
nologies that are already in use do not perform equally well on differ-
ent populations. Indeed, the error rate varies so wildly across different
demographics that the one government agency (NIST) that performs
audits on facial recognition algorithms for volunteer vendors issued an
entire report detailing so-called “demographic differentials,” or higher
inaccuracy for certain demographics.62 Such disparate effects have
been known since at least 2003, as reported by NIST in the 2002 Face
Recognition Vendor Test.63 Most of the 126 algorithms studied by
NIST in 2019 were found to have higher false positive results for wo-
men than men. The highest error rate occurs with images of American
Indians: one algorithm tested had an error rate for American Indian
women that was sixty-eight times higher than the rate of error for
58. Id.
59. See Taylor R. Moore, Trade Secrets and Algorithms as Barriers to Social Jus-
tice, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Aug. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/08/2017-
07-31-Trade-Secret-Algorithms-as-Barriers-to-Social-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D5AM-3KU5]. Developers rely on trade secret common law to protect algorithms
from public disclosure because, as an abstract mathematical formula, the Supreme
Court held that they are ineligible for patent protection. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188 (1981). FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 83 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2015) (explaining trade secret protection never expires and never needs to
be publicly disclosed); see generally CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EM-
PLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-
1930 37 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2009).
60. NIST Evaluation Shows Advance in Face Recognition Software’s Capabilities,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/
news/2018/11/nist-evaluation-shows-advance-face-recognition-softwares-capabilities
[https://perma.cc/2RJY-KV6X] (finding facial recognition became twenty times better
between 2014 and 2018); see also GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 n.1, 16.
61. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Facial Recognition Has Already Reached Its
Breaking Point, WIRED (May 22, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-
recognition-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/3EJG-MCA].
62. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 6; Joss Fong, What Facial Recognition
Steals From Us, VOX (Dec. 10, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/
10/21003466/facial-recognition-anonymity-explained-video [https://perma.cc/RA4K-
4S47] (describing how facial recognition algorithms work); James Vincent, Gender
and Racial Bias Found in Amazon’s Facial Recognition Technology (Again), THE
VERGE (Jan. 25, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/25/18197137/ama-
zon-rekognition-facial-recognition-bias-race-gender [https://perma.cc/F4CF-9GU3].
63. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 18; PATRICK GROTHER, ROSS
MICHEALS & P. JONATHON PHILLIPS, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH, FACE REC-
OGNITION VENDOR TEST 2002 PERFORMANCE METRICS 7 (2003).
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white men. There is also a higher error rate for women of Asian and
African descent.64
The reasons why facial recognition technology generally performs
better on white populations and performs worse on minority popula-
tions are not definitively known, but two reasons are often proposed:
skewed data and programmer bias (implicit or actual).65 First, the
dataset that an algorithm uses to train itself is skewed, as it contains
more white images than non-white images. Thus, the algorithm more
accurately recognizes white images simply because it has more prac-
tice recognizing white images. Some companies have blamed the
datasets on which algorithms are initially trained and have taken steps
to create more “balanced” datasets66—some via unscrupulous means.
For example, in order to rectify the paucity of face images of people of
African descent in its training dataset for the Pixel 4 smartphone, a
Google contractor claimed that Google had instructed its contractors
to target black homeless people and students, take their pictures, and
then give them a $5 gift card in exchange for adding their picture to
Google’s facial recognition training database.67 Other companies
claim to have improved the accuracy of their facial recognition tech-
nology by creating balanced and diverse datasets.68 Second, some re-
searchers claim that programmers’ own biases affect their coding,
saying that because the majority of programmers are white men, their
bias and weaker ability to identify non-white faces compared to white
ones may permeate the actual coding.69
64. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 47.
65. See, e.g., Joy Buolamwin & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accu-
racy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, PROC. MACHINE LEARNING
RSCH. 3 (2018) (showing that an MIT study of datasets used to train facial recognition
algorithms overrepresented lighter males and underrepresented both darker females
and darker individuals in general); Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recogni-
tion Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-
recognition-systems/476991/ [https://perma.cc/7X88-7EQS].
66. See Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin Type Bias in Commercial
Artificial Intelligence Systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), http://news.mit.edu/2018/
study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 [https://
perma.cc/8F8A-83AC] (quoting IBM engineer who claims to have improved accuracy
through use of “balanced types”).
67. Isobel Agher Hamilton, Google Suspended Research for the Pixel 4
Smartphone After Reportedly Targeting Homeless Black People, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7,
2019, 8:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-suspends-facial-recognition-
research-after-daily-news-report-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/8TWU-UZH8].
68. See Queenie Wong, Why Facial Recognition’s Racial Bias Problem Is So Hard
to Crack, CNET (Mar. 27, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-facial-
recognitions-racial-bias-problem-is-so-hard-to-crack/ [https://perma.cc/LGA3-7PSX]
(highlighting Microsoft’s claims that it “reduced error rates for women and darker-
skinned men by up to [twenty] times”).
69. See id. A third reason that may explain the “demographic differential” in facial
recognition technology is that the algorithm itself is not race blind: it takes race into
account. Then, due to either skewed data or programming bias, the algorithm pro-
duces less accurate results for certain demographics. Some types of facial recognition
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Despite attempts to identify reasons why algorithms may give bi-
ased results and the subsequent attempts to correct algorithms
through better data or better programming, the problem of “demo-
graphic differentials” has proven intractable.70 In a 2019 congressional
hearing on facial recognition, the director of the Information Technol-
ogy Lab at NIST said that it is unlikely that facial recognition technol-
ogy will ever perform equally well across groups of people.71 Even
Idemia, a company whose algorithm was tested by NIST in its 2019
audit and was found to have a lower inaccuracy rate across
demographics than the other algorithms tested,72 still tested with an
error rate that was ten times worse for black women than the error
rate for white women.73
The unknown factor that has proven so difficult to correct is the
same factor that made facial recognition technology so much better
(for white males) over the past five years: artificial intelligence.74
Now, instead of using the algorithm as it was designed by the
programmer, the algorithm “learns” from new images and corrects it-
technology do code for race, labeling faces as “white” or “black” in their processes for
matching, but whether race is actually used as a factor in the code was not tested in
NIST’s report. See PATRICK J. GROTHER, MEI L. NGAN, KAYEE K. HANAOKA, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ONGOING FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST
(FRVT) PART 2: IDENTIFICATION 3, 20 (Nov. 2018), https://doi.org/10.6028/
NIST.IR.8238 [https://perma.cc/FNH8-WHQY].
70. See Wong, supra note 68.
71. Jack Corrigan, Experts Tell Congress Bias Problem May Be Here to Stay,
NEXTGOV (July 10, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2019/07/experts-tell-
congress-facial-recognitions-bias-problem-may-be-here-stay/158320/ [https://perma.cc/
S4BG-K8NC].
72. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 8.
73. Tom Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces
Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algo-
rithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/ [https://perma.cc/3PY7-VCLZ] (noting
also that Idemia software is used by the FBI). But see Stephane Gentric, Research
Unit Manager, Senior Expert, Idemia, Face Recognition Evaluation @ Idemia (April
4, 2018), https://nigos.nist.gov/ifpc2018/presentations/44_gentric_Idemia_IFPC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JLW-RYVS] (claiming that Idemia has the same error rate for
black and white people as well as males and females); Liz Do, Study Takes AIM at
Biased AI Facial-Recognition Technology, PHYS.ORG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://phys.org/
news/2019-02-aim-biased-ai-facial-recognition-technology.html [https://perma.cc/
ES5X-RJ28] (discussing how Amazon’s Recognition software, formerly used by po-
lice in Orlando, Florida, had nearly 100% accuracy with light-skinned men, but mis-
classified darker-skinned women as men 31% of the time); Anita Chabria, Facial
Recognition Software Mistook 1 in 5 California Lawmakers for Criminals, Says
ACLU, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/
story/2019-08-12/facial-recognition-software-mistook-1-in-5-california-lawmakers-for-
criminals-says-aclu [https://perma.cc/A46C-4CVZ].
74. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 69, at 2; see also Information Access Division,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad [https://perma.cc/
FH57-N3XQ] (describing how NIST is helping facial-recognition technology make
strides via machine learning and deep neural networks); Steve Lohr, Facial Recogni-
tion Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/B2U6-GQ25].
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self to produce more accurate results.75 But facial recognition technol-
ogy that uses deep neural networks (“DNN”) to identify faces will
ultimately have unpredictable flaws because the original programmers
do not know exactly which attributes the network has learned to pro-
duce the correct result.76 A DNN might use background, color, or tex-
ture in the photograph instead of facial features: characteristics that
may come up with the right result sometimes but can easily lead to
inaccurate and unpredictable results.77 For example, a DNN trained to
recognize animals might correctly label a panda, but then if it is shown
an image of random pixels, the next time it “sees” the image of a
panda, it might mislabel it as a gibbon.78 It is unclear why the image of
random pixels will change the algorithm’s output.79
Such unknown variables and consequent mistakes make it very dif-
ficult to correct the algorithm for demographic differentials. As long
as the algorithm correctly identifies some percentage of images in a
dataset (despite how homogenous the dataset, and despite how egre-
gious the wrong answers are (e.g., Google’s mistake)), companies sell-
ing their facial recognition technology can tout the positives and bury
the negatives due to a lack of regulation governing standards it must
meet in order to be sold.80 The market does not self-correct in this
case because there is little incentive for the employer to gauge how
accurate the technology is. For most jobs, there will be more qualified
applicants than vacancies. Even if the technology produces outcomes
favoring one group over another, the employer will still accomplish
the goal of filling the position with an applicant with no criminal back-
ground, and one person will get the job.
In Cathy O’Neill’s pioneering book, Weapons of Math Destruction,
she posits that algorithms should be judged by weighing the relative
harms of false positives and false negatives.81 A false positive for the
applicant means that the applicant does not get the job and is shut out
from consideration from ever getting the job. A false negative for the
applicant means someone whose picture should have matched some-
75. See SEAN GERRISH, HOW SMART MACHINES THINK loc. 426 (2018) (ebook);
see also Douglas Heaven, Why Deep-Learning AIs are So Easy to Fool, NATURE (Oct.
9, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03013-5 [https://perma.cc/JYP3-
Q9B4] (explaining how deep neural networks use large data sets to make new connec-
tions in an electronic neural network to achieve a desired result).
76. See Heaven, supra note 75.
77. See id. at 3.
78. Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy, Explaining and Har-
nessing Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015, 3 (Mar. 20, 2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1412.6572.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC5T-GK2W].
79. See Heaven, supra note 75, at 3 (noting also a DNN that labeled a dragonfly as
a manhole and a mushroom as a pretzel).
80. Other than, generally, the FTC’s general jurisdiction over false advertising
claims. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PRI-
VACY LAW AND POLICY 119 (2016).
81. CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 199 (2016).
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one with a criminal background gets the job. From the employer’s per-
spective, the relative harm of a false negative is much greater than
that of a false positive. But for the applicant with a clean record, the
relative harm of being unfairly shut out by a false positive is much
greater.
The purpose of anti-discrimination law is to ensure that employers
do not use unjustified means when reaching those outcomes and to
balance the relative harms that come from any employment practice.
Currently, African Americans, women, and people with darker skin
have a much higher risk of a false positive and of being shut out from
job consideration with a false positive. Employers actually have a
higher risk of a false negative if they use facial recognition technology
than if they do not; the inaccuracy of some matches (both false nega-
tives and false positives) will skew the data. The relative harm of the
false positive is something that the EEOC should focus its enforce-
ment on to keep from entrenching automated discrimination in the
job market.
III. USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY IN BACKGROUND
CHECKS VIOLATES ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
making employment decisions because of an individual’s sex or race,
or to limit, segregate, or classify employees because of race or sex in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities.82
Generally, courts test for the presence of employment discrimina-
tion with one of two separate inquiries: Whether the employer was
intentionally motivated by race or sex in making an adverse employ-
ment determination, or whether a facially neutral practice had a dis-
criminatory effect—or a disparate impact—on a plaintiff member of a
protected class.83 The use of facial recognition technology in back-
ground checks certainly implicates disparate impact discrimination.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (stating protected classes also include color, re-
ligion, and national origin). Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is illegal
for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color,
religion, sex or national origin, or to limit, segregate or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id.
83. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 694 (2016).
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A. Disparate Impact Discrimination: The Effects of Using Facial
Recognition Technology
When employers use facial recognition as part of the background
check to screen employees in the onboarding process, they will inevi-
tably violate Title VII due to the inaccuracies of the algorithms’ per-
formance and the disparate impact the technology has on members of
protected classes.
The standard for disparate impact discrimination is a burden-shift-
ing standard: (1) The plaintiff files suit and bears the burden of pro-
duction and persuasion to establish that an employment practice has a
discriminatory effect on a protected class.84 If the plaintiff fails at this
stage, the employer prevails. (2) If the plaintiff fulfills her burden, the
employer then must demonstrate that the practice is “job-related and
consistent with business necessity” (per statute in 1991).85 If the em-
ployer fails at this stage, the plaintiff prevails. (3) The plaintiff must
then prove that the employer’s interest could be served equally effec-
tively by an alternative employment practice with less of a discrimina-
tory impact.86
1. Discriminatory Effect
Companies such as Wag! openly tell a job candidate that they will
be submitting a photograph that will be run through facial recognition
technology in the candidate’s background check, and obtain the candi-
date’s consent to do so, so the process is known to the candidate.87 A
candidate facing adverse action from a potential employer may not
know the specific algorithm that the company is using for its facial
recognition component of the background check, but the 2019 NIST
report has shown that when matching a known face to a group of
other known faces in a large database, such as a mug shot database,
the algorithms that were tested generally provide more false positive
matches (and thus more flags when compared with a criminal
database) for women, American Indians, people of African descent,
and people of Asian descent, and no vendor nor algorithm has come
up with a solution to the problem of demographic inaccuracy.88
The employer may claim that the individual algorithm used by the
background check vendor was not a part of the NIST study, and there-
fore cannot be assumed to have a discriminatory effect, but due to the
84. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
85. See id. at 431–32; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(4)(A) (1988).
86. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
87. Wag + Vetty – Background Screening, WAG!, https://vetty.co/wagvetty-back-
ground-screening/ [https://perma.cc/8N5Z-U34P].
88. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 2; see also Facial Recognition Technol-
ogy Falsely Identifies Famous Athletes, ACLU MASS. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://
www.aclum.org/en/news/facial-recognition-technology-falsely-identifies-famous-ath-
letes [https://perma.cc/P7PN-FDUD].
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intractability of the inaccuracy issue and the fact that no company has
volunteered an algorithm to NIST without demographic inaccuracy, it
is unlikely that any facial recognition software would not have a dis-
criminatory effect, especially considering the director of NIST admit-
ted in a congressional hearing that it is unlikely that facial recognition
technology would ever perform equally well across groups of people.89
The discriminatory effect on women, people of African and Asian
descent, and American Indians also may be stronger than an analysis
that just focuses on the facial recognition algorithm of the background
check will reveal. In the Georgetown Perpetual Lineup study, re-
searchers found that facial recognition databases used by law enforce-
ment often do not limit enrollment based on arrests without charges
or not-guilty verdicts,90 meaning that a false match to someone in the
database may not even be flagging someone with a criminal record,
but rather someone who was arrested for any reason (be it a political
protest or a false accusation). This kind of match may be accurate, i.e.,
matching an image to a person of the correct identity in the database.
But the flag itself will be inaccurate, reporting a criminal background
for someone without one. Because African Americans are over-
represented in the criminal justice system, they will be affected not
only by algorithmic inaccuracy but by accurate matches to background
falsely flagged as criminal.91 When the database is stacked with photos
of African Americans, and the algorithm has trained itself to provide
false positive matches for photos of African Americans, the impact
the use of such software has on African Americans is exponentially
greater than a white male would face.
Additionally, the facial recognition algorithms that law enforcement
agencies use to initially identify their dataset are also subject to inac-
curacies, and indeed, make no guarantee of the accuracy of their prod-
ucts.92 If the inaccuracy of such algorithms leads to false positives in
the database, the database itself may be corrupted by containing mul-
tiple people labeled with one identity. When the background check
facial recognition algorithm with a propensity for false positive
matches for African American women, for example, then runs a check
on this data, there will be an exponential chance that an African
American woman will be matched to at least one face that is labeled
with a criminal identity. Inaccuracies thus have a multiplying effect,
and inaccuracies correlated to demographics have an unfair effect on
protected class members.
The use of facial recognition software in background checks can be
compared to how courts have treated employers’ advertising and
89. See Corrigan, supra note 71.
90. See Garvie et al., supra note 9, at 24, 30.
91. See id. at 53.
92. See id. at 46 (discussing Face First contract with San Diego Association of
Governments).
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recruiting practices as evidence of discriminatory effect. The statutory
text of Title VII allows courts to consider an employer’s advertising
and recruiting practices as evidence of employment discrimination.93
Courts have held employers liable for both advertisement placement
(e.g., an advertisement for non-management roles is placed in a fe-
male-only help wanted column)94 as well as word of mouth hiring
practices (e.g., not informing a black teacher of job opportunities and
vacancies after she requested them, when word of mouth was the only
way to know of openings).95
Compared to these cases that analyze advertising placement or
word of mouth, the use of facial recognition technology as a screening
tool in background checks before a candidate begins employment is a
more direct barrier to employment and a clearer adverse action. With
advertising placements, the employers argued that the EEOC failed to
consider that women might not want the job and would not apply,
weeding themselves out through “self-selection,” but the court did not
find that argument persuasive when the company advertised sex-spe-
cific roles to women in “female-only” help wanted columns in newspa-
pers.96 In the facial recognition context, self-selection is not a factor:
Those who apply for the job have already self-selected for the job, not
against it. Weeding people out by using facial recognition technology
in the background check process similarly guarantees an uneven play-
ing ground. Instead of advertising non-management roles exclusively
to women, the company now allows everyone to apply, but weeds out
women (or American Indians or people of African descent) at the
background check stage.
2. Job-Related
If the court finds that the plaintiff has met his or her burden in
proving a discriminatory effect, the employer may argue that the prac-
tice of using facial recognition in background checks is job-related and
consistent with business necessity because the usual background
checks are not as accurate and it is necessary to hire the best employ-
ees without problematic backgrounds. For example, using facial recog-
nition would be consistent with business necessity when hiring for jobs
such as dog walker, which is a position of trust and care that someone
hires someone for, and which includes duties such as potentially enter-
93. See Pauline T. Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment
Recruiting, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 93, 107 (2018).
94. In Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., the EEOC supported a claim that the em-
ployer did not promote females at the same rate as males by citing to its advertising
practices. 711 F.2d 647, 658–59. (5th Cir. 1983). The company advertised non-manage-
ment jobs in “female” newspaper help wanted columns and placed management ad-
vertisements in male help wanted columns. Id.; see also Kim & Scott, supra note 93, at
110.
95. See United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1088–90 (6th Cir. 1998).
96. Capaci, 711 F.2d at 653, 658–59.
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ing the employer’s home when no one else is home. Employers may
also argue that using algorithmic decision-making is more objective
than using a human to review background checks.
The standard that courts use to evaluate an employer’s profferred
business necessity reason is a loose standard, which asks whether the
practice is sufficiently “job-related.”97 For example, the Eighth Circuit
requires that hiring criteria bear a “manifest relationship” to employ-
ment, and the Third Circuit requires “employers show that a discrimi-
natory hiring policy accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an
applicant’s ability to perform successfully the job in question.”98
Under these loose standards, algorithmic decision making, if based on
seeking traits that are “job-related,” will probably be accepted as
“business necessity.”99
However, facial recognition technology is different in that its use
actually undermines the business necessity of verifying identity and
matching a person with a criminal background. The plaintiff may ar-
gue that this use of facial recognition technology does not achieve the
job-related business necessity claimed by the employer because the
technology performs less accurately on members of protected classes
and therefore actually undermines the task of hiring the right em-
ployee for the job.
3. Alternative Non-Discriminatory Means
In order to prove that the employer’s interest could be served
equally effectively by an alternative employment practice, the plaintiff
may then argue that the same purpose is effected by a traditional
background check that screens names and social security numbers,
without the added component of adding someone’s physical appear-
ance and potential matches with mug shots into the mix. The practice
is not only inconsistent with the business necessity of accurate back-
ground checks; the practice actually makes those background checks
more inaccurate, particularly for American Indians, Asian women,
and black women.100 Using facial recognition technology that pro-
duces a likely match is less likely to catch true matches that would not
be otherwise caught by a search of name, birthday, and social security
number, and in fact has been shown to catch more false positives.101
Additionally, there is nothing that guarantees that algorithmic deci-
sion-making is less biased or more objective than human review.102
97. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 83, at 705.
98. Id. at 705, n.171; Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010); El v.
Se. Pa. Transport. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007).
99. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 83, at 706 (“The threshold issue is clearly
whether the sought-after trait—the target variable—is job related, regardless of the
machinery used to predict it.”).
100. See Gebhart, supra note 36.
101. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3.
102. See Confone, supra note 14, at 1394–406.
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B. EEOC Guidance on Background Checks and
Pre-Employment Inquiries
The EEOC should issue guidance cautioning employers that use of
facial recognition technology in making employment decisions (in-
cluding its use in background checks) may subject employers to law-
suits under Title VII.103 EEOC rules, like rules issued from other
federal agencies, fill the gaps between orders given in a statutory
scheme by telling private entities how they can comply. Guidance then
fills the gaps between administrative rules.104 Such guidance would
likely have the effect both of fewer employers using facial recognition
technology in background checks, and preventing employers from be-
ing sued by job candidates solely because of the use of a technology
that does not further their purpose in flagging employees with crimi-
nal backgrounds.
The EEOC has already issued guidance on pre-employment inquir-
ies, recommending that employers not ask for photographs of appli-
cants, and if one is needed for identification purposes, to request it
after the employment offer has been extended and accepted.105 The
guidance specifies that information regarding race, sex, national ori-
gin, and religion are irrelevant in determining whether the person is
qualified for the job.106 Inquiries that relate to or disproportionately
screen out candidates based on race, color, sex, national origin, or re-
ligion may be used as evidence of an employer’s intent to discrimi-
nate, unless the questions have a business purpose.107 EEOC guidance
also makes clear that employers must not use information they receive
in background checks, from any source, to discriminate, emphasizing
that employers must “take special care” when basing employment de-
cisions on background problems that have a disproportionate impact
on people of a certain race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.108 If
employers do use information from background checks to make an
adverse employment decision, the Federal Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) obligates them to notify the applicant that he or she was
rejected because of information in the background check report, in-
103. Senator Kamala Harris has also proposed that the EEOC issue such guidance.
Letter from Senator Kamala Harris to the Honorable Victoria Lipnic (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.scribd.com/document/388920670/SenHarris-EEOC-Facial-Recognition-2
[https://perma.cc/46P9-78A3].
104. Nicholas R. Parillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Em-
pirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 167–69 (2019).
105. Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices: Pre-Employment Inquiries, U.S.





108. Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-
PORTUNITIES COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/back
ground_checks_employers.cfm [https://perma.cc/W4M6-2RBN].
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cluding the contact information for the company that sold the
report.109
Using facial recognition technology to analyze images of a candi-
date is no different than directly asking candidates for a photograph
and making a hiring decision that takes that photograph into account.
The request for a photograph alone is not sufficient to make the em-
ployer liable for employment discrimination, but without a legitimate
business reason that could not be served by alternative means, em-
ployers leave themselves open to liability through Title VII suits.
By issuing guidance, the EEOC can put employers on notice that
facial recognition technology is not a special, objective way to use in-
formation about appearance to make employment decisions. Rather,
like any other method of making employment decisions, its use is sub-
ject to scrutiny under existing anti-discrimination law by the EEOC
and potential plaintiffs.
Issuing guidance about facial recognition technology would fit into
the EEOC’s past practices.110 The EEOC has previously cautioned
employers against requesting photographs in resumes,111 indiscrimi-
nately using big data,112 and using criminal background checks gener-
ally.113 The guideline on the use of criminal background checks states
109. Id.
110. See generally Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1996) (discuss-
ing the role of the EEOC in employment discrimination claims).
111. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s As-
sistant Legal Counsel Carol R. Miaskoff to the Public (Oct. 5, 2004) (on file on the
EEOC website), https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/eeoc-informal-discussion-letter-119
[https://perma.cc/TT2B-66V4]; Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices: Pre-Em-
ployment Inquiries, supra note 105 (“[E]mployers should not ask for a photograph of
an applicant. If needed for identification purposes, a photograph may be obtained
after an offer of employment is made and accepted.”).
112. Press Release from the EEOC, Use of Big Data Has Implications for Equal
Employment, Panel Tells EEOC (Oct. 13, 2016) (on file on the EEOC website),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-13-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/8ZDD-
5ZC9].
113. See, e.g., Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know, supra note 108
(“Take special care when basing employment decisions on background problems that
may be more common among people of a certain race, color, national origin, sex, or
religion; among people who have a disability; or among people age 40 or older. For
example, employers should not use a policy or practice that excludes people with
certain criminal records if the policy or practice significantly disadvantages individuals
of a particular race, national origin, or another protected characteristic, and does not
accurately predict who will be a responsible, reliable, or safe employee. In legal terms,
the policy or practice has a “disparate impact” and is not “job related and consistent
with business necessity.”); Pre-Employment Inquiries and Arrest & Conviction, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquir-
ies_arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/WJ7L-GNP2]; Enforcement Guidance on
the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N (Apr. 25,
2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/
569G-9Y4K].
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that an arrest should be treated differently from a conviction. It is
generally permissible to screen based on criminal background checks
if the employer “develops a targeted screen considering the nature of
the crime, the time elapsed and the nature of the job.” However, in
the facial recognition context, even more so than in a regular back-
ground check, there is no guarantee of a targeted screen. An al-
gorithm searching through law-enforcement databases flags applicants
based on mere arrest records because these photograph records are
readily available, not convictions.114 Facial recognition makes use of
several tactics that the EEOC has already warned against in screening
applicants: making employment decisions based on photographs, and
using a broad-based screen to eliminate applicants with an arrest, not
just a conviction.
C. Employers Who Use Facial Recognition Technology in
Background Checks May Face EEOC Litigation
Under Title VII
In addition to providing guidance to employers, the EEOC should
use its enforcement authority to file lawsuits against employers who
use facial recognition technology in background checks. The EEOC
will play an especially important role in these kinds of cases because,
as discussed above,115 applicants who submit to facial recognition
technology in background checks may have little sense of why they
were rejected, and thus will not have the motive to sue to get discov-
ery. Plaintiffs, and their potential attorneys, may face too much uncer-
tainty to invest resources in beginning the litigation process. This is
particularly the case after the 2011 Supreme Court decision that made
it more difficult for private plaintiffs to bring claims of systemic dis-
crimination and raised the standard for certifying class action
lawsuits.116
The EEOC may begin enforcement through its administrative pro-
cess, investigating charges of employment discrimination that include
systemic discrimination.117 The EEOC will be able to invest resources
in addressing the problem that plaintiffs may not be able or willing to
address due to the uncertainty they face when they are not hired.
Through its investigation process, the EEOC can analyze the hiring
data from employers that have used facial recognition technology and
determine whether its use results in significant statistical disparities
114. See Garvie et al., supra note 9, at 28.
115. See supra Part II.A.
116. See Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement
and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1133, 1134 (2015); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
117. See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm [https://
perma.cc/D6NE-6NBH].
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for different groups of protected class members. The NIST data ana-
lyzed algorithms that were voluntarily submitted by companies, and
the algorithms significantly underperformed. The EEOC may discover
that a company’s use of facial recognition technology that was not vol-
untarily submitted for NIST audit has even worse effects on job appli-
cants, thereby sparking an interest in auditing and improvement of the
facial recognition technology it uses before selling it to employers.
The EEOC may also litigate when it does not resolve charges
through its administrative processes, exposing employers to litiga-
tion.118 Such public enforcement of civil rights is dependent on the
political will of the presidential administration;119 however, even ad-
ministrations with substandard records on civil rights enforcement120
may find that due to the employment crisis caused by the COVID-19
pandemic,121 there is political will to take down such automated barri-
ers to employment in order to ease the crisis.
Employers themselves should be wary of the use of facial recogni-
tion technology in hiring, and not only due to the employment dis-
crimination liability they may face, and not only through the use of the
software. Even just a trial run for the use of facial recognition technol-
ogy may result in liability. If an employer wants to perform a trial run
with a new vendor who uses facial recognition technology, then dis-
covers that the algorithm has a disparate impact on a protected class
and the majority of people who pass the background check are white
men, throwing the results out on the basis of a protected characteristic
can itself be a basis for disparate impact liability.122 In Ricci v. DeStef-
ano, the Supreme Court held that when an employer refused to certify
exam results that would have resulted in “too many whites” receiving
promotions,123 such “express, race-based decisionmaking violate[d]
Title VII’s command that employers cannot take adverse employment
actions because of an individual’s race.”124 Here, if an employer used
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 434, 436 (2007).
120. See, e.g., Jessica Huseman & Annie Waldman, Trump Administration Quietly
Rolls Back Civil Rights Efforts Across Federal Government, PROPUBLICA (June 15,
2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-administration-rolls-back-civil-rights-
efforts-federal-government [https://perma.cc/D4P9-TGS8]; Trump Administration
Civil and Human Rights Rollbacks, 2017–2020, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM.
RTS. (May 13, 2020), https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks/ [https://perma.cc/7FSR-
T3FE].
121. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, ‘Nowhere to Hide’ as Unemployment Permeates
the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/busi-
ness/economy/unemployment-numbers-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/CY44-
FR4N].
122. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562–63 (2009).
123. Id. at 579 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn.
2006)).
124. Id. at 579 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); see also id. at 581–82 (allowing
race-based decisionmaking based on a good faith belief that such decisionmaking
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facial recognition software as part of a background check, then discov-
ered that the result was to not offer employment to any minority can-
didates, the employer would not be able to “re-screen” the minority
applicants without scrutiny from majority groups who would not bene-
fit from the rescreening. And if, on the other hand, the hiring process
overall resulted in more members of the protected class being hired
than non-members, if facial recognition software has a discriminatory
effect against individual members of the protected class, the employer
can still be found liable.125
Depending on the scale of an employer’s hiring practices, the liabili-
ties an employer may face may be significant. If there were a class
action lawsuit for all candidates who applied for a particular position
and were subject to facial recognition software, the employer would
have the burden of proving that each individual member of the class
was not affected. Otherwise, in a pattern or practice of discrimination
suit, each member of the class is presumed to be the victim of
discrimination.126
The employer would also not be spared from a disparate impact
challenge by adding subjective criteria (meaning criteria that is not
standardized but is rather based on the exercise of personal judg-
ment), such as an interview with a current employee as part of the
hiring process, in addition to passing the facial recognition criteria.127
Subjective criteria, as well as objective criteria such as aptitude tests,
are also subject to disparate impact analysis.128
Employers who nonetheless insist on using facial recognition tech-
nology may argue that if candidates give consent to use their photo in
a facial recognition process as part of hiring, giving consent may pre-
vent the candidates from claiming that the process is discriminatory.
But here, unlike in other contexts where signing terms and conditions
cleanse questionable practices, the Court has held that if a practice is
discriminatory, it cannot be bargained away.129 Even with the candi-
dates’ consent, an employer who uses facial recognition technology in
avoided disparate impact liability and would lead to racial quota and other impermis-
sible race-based action).
125. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982). When the employer im-
posed, as an absolute condition for consideration for promotion, that applicants pass a
written test that excluded blacks in disproportionate numbers and that was not job
related, the employer was still held to have violated Title VII even though the “bot-
tom line result” of the promotion practice was to hire a higher proportion of blacks
than whites. Id. at 451.
126. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
127. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
128. Id. at 900.
129. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). An employee
who must arbitrate a discrimination claim under a collective bargaining agreement
may still bring Title VII claims in federal court because the right to a discrimination-
free workplace cannot be bargained away. Id. at 52.
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background checks faces potential liability under Title VII.130 Consent
to the use of facial recognition in a background check does not mean
consent to discrimination.
IV. UNJUSTIFIED MEANS
Because of the disadvantages and legal liabilities employers may
face based on their use of facial recognition technology in background
checks, the use of the technology seems to be more trouble than it is
worth to employers as a screening tool: the means do not justify any
end, as they make the results of the background check less accurate.
Although vendors may tout the high accuracy of their facial recogni-
tion algorithms, the majority of algorithms have not been indepen-
dently tested. Of those that have been independently tested by NIST,
most show major inaccuracies when handling photographs of individu-
als who are not white men.131 Both the legal and the technical disad-
vantages seem to outweigh any advantage in using facial recognition
technology as a background check screening tool.
This is not to say that all facial recognition technology is inherently
and irredeemably biased or discriminatory. Facial recognition models
that use enormous amounts of data to analyze distances between fa-
cial features, such as the local feature analysis method, may not have
the same discriminatory effect as facial recognition that uses principal
component analysis, which uses relatively few data points in order to
speed up the matching process and increase the efficiency of the
model.132 It is possible that local feature analysis algorithms would
produce output that is similarly accurate across demographics. But
such a method would require a vast amount of computer processing
power and a way of correcting the images for face position, and may
not yet be commercially viable. Perhaps with further advancement in
computer processing power, facial recognition analysis can change the
inquiry back to which face is most like the target face, instead of
which face is most likely to match.
As the technology currently stands and is sold to employers, facial
recognition use in background checks is discriminatory. The Supreme
Court recognized in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas that the purpose of
Congress in enacting Title VII was “to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and de-
vices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.”133 Using facial recognition technol-
130. In addition to any potential liability under the FCRA, which may be between
$100 and $1,000 per violation. See Neumeyer, supra note 7.
131. See, e.g., GROTHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–3.
132. The NIST report did not examine the underlying code to assess why these
demographic differentials were being produced. See id. at 9.
133. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citations
omitted).
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ogy in background checks does the opposite: it provides inequality of
employment opportunities and creates a resurgence in discriminatory
practices which foster racially stratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens.
